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According to the sensorimotor account, vision does not imply 
the construction of internally generated representations of the 
environment, but it is the skillful exercise of the sensorimotor 
contingencies obeying sense-specific laws. In this short study, 
I focus on the notion of “sensorimotor law” and characterize 
the kind of explanation provided by the sensorimotor theory 
as a form of covering law model. I then question the nature of 
such sensorimotor laws and describe them as mechanisms. I 
show that a mechanistic interpretation provides a better 
account of the sensorimotor invariances, which fosters us to 
rebalance the explanatory burden of sensorimotor action and 
information. Finally, I show that the question of the role of 
representations within the sensorimotor theory should be 
reconsidered.  
Keywords: Sensorimotor theory of vision; representations; 
mental mechanisms; explanation. 
Introduction 
In recent years we have witnessed the emergence of a new 
research paradigm in vision studies: the sensorimotor 
approach. First put forward in a paper written by Noë and 
O’Regan (2001), the sensorimotor account represents an 
attempt to explain vision and visual consciousness without 
relying on internally generated models of the external world. 
Against the Orthodox account of vision (the expression is 
due to Noë & Thompson 2005), which claims that to 
perceive something visually our brains construct complex 
and detailed representations of the external world, defenders 
of the sensorimotor account maintain that visual perception 
is constituted by the active exercise of our sensorimotor 
contingencies which obey a set of sense-specific laws.  
In this study, I set out to examine which kind of 
explanation of visual consciousness is provided by the 
sensorimotor account. I will argue that the appeal to 
sensorimotor laws makes the deductive nomological model 
a perfect candidate. However, in contrast to the 
sensorimotor theorists, I argue that sensorimotor laws are 
better described in mechanistic terms. The dichotomy 
presented here between a “law” interpretation and a 
“mechanistic” interpretation of the sensorimotor invariances 
has several relevant consequences. I will argue that if we 
characterize such invariances as mechanisms, the role of the 
internal information processing and perhaps of 
representations has to be reconsidered. 
In the following pages I will primarily refer to O’Regan & 
Noë (2001) as it is the main source for all subsequent 
developments of the sensorimotor account.  
Outline of the Sensorimotor Theory 
In overt contrast with traditional accounts of vision, 
defenders of the sensorimotor theory contend that the 
purpose of vision is not the construction of internal 
representations of the external world, but rather the 
exploration of the environment through the active exercise 
of the sensorimotor contingencies. Of course, 
representationalist thories of vision do not deny that 
representations are employed to guide the organism in the 
environment. The crucial difference between the two 
accounts is that the sensorimotor theorists identify the 
coding of vision exactly in the organism’s sensorimotor 
response: it is precisely the exercise of the sensorimotor 
skills that constitute visual perception.  
What the authors call “sensorimotor contingencies” are 
the motor actions exhibited by the organism and the 
associated changes in sensory input. What distinguishes the 
senses from one another, according to the sensorimotor 
theory, is therefore not some specific nerve energy (Gorea 
1991) that accounts for the diversity of experiences in 
different sense modalities thanks to some intrinsic quality of 
the signal transmitted by the neurons. The senses are 
individuated by a set of rules that govern the sense-specific 
sensorimotor contingencies. The distinctive character of 
vision is the result of a very specific set of rules or “laws” 
(O’Regan & Noë 2001, p. 941) that modulate the motor 
actions triggered by the external objects.  
There are two kinds or “categories” of sensorimotor 
contingencies. The first kind is that of the sensorimotor 
contingencies determined by the visual system, whereas the 
second kind is specific to the visual attributes such as shapes 
and colors. The distinction between two kinds of 
sensorimotor contingencies is roughly equivalent to the 
distinction between sensation and perception. In fact, the 
first kind is “independent of any characterization or 
interpretation of objects” (O’Regan & Noë 2001, p. 943) 
and can be considered as the fundamental level of visual 
sensation, whereas sensorimotor contingencies determined 
by visual attributes are specific to visual features at the 
higher perceptual level. Later, I will briefly discuss two 
examples of such sensorimotor laws. 
Noë and O’Regan argue that, in order to perceive 
something visually, the organism must not only explore the 
environment through the two kinds of sensorimotor 
contingencies. The organism must also actively exercise “its 
mastery of these laws” (O’Regan & Noë 2001, p. 943). This 
implies that the organism must possess a distinctive know-
how of the sensorimotor laws. Moreover, the sensorimotor 
contingencies must be activated by an object in the external 
world (Noë 2005). 
Obviously, the sensorimotor contingencies are not 
unknown to visual scientists: the theory’s original claim is 
that the laws governing them constitute a representation-free 
code of visual perception. O’Regan and Noë do not exactly 
deny the existence of representations (2001, p. 1017), yet 
they seem to maintain that representations are not 
explanatory relevant for visual perception. Allegedly, this 
model sidesteps a number of problems summoned by the 
Orthodox view. Vision is not the construction of an internal 
representation of the world. This way of conceiving vision 
would be analogous to some version of Cartesian 
materialism (Dennett 1991). Cartesian materialism is not 
exactly a philosophical doctrine, but rather a way of 
conceptualizing the relation between representations and 
consciousness. According to this standpoint, representations 
would be conscious once they obtain access to some brain 
region(s) whose function is that of producing consciousness.  
Sensorimotor theorists claim that the Orthodox standpoint 
would lead us to a conceptual dead-end when we try to 
explain consciousness and vision. Postulating the existence 
of functional regions in the brain that simply make the 
representations conscious does not contribute to explain 
visual consciousness and gives rise to an insurmountable 
explanatory gap.   
A DN Model of Vision? 
From the viewpoint of philosophy of science, there are 
several interesting questions. In this context, I focus my 
remarks on the notion of explanation, and ask what kind of 
explanation is provided by the sensorimotor theory.  
Let us briefly recall the main features of this account: 
visual perception is the active exercise of the sensorimotor 
contingencies; sensorimotor contingencies obey a set of 
sense-specific laws; moreover, they must be activated by an 
object in the external world. Thus, perception is the action 
response triggered by an object and structured according to 
the sense-specific laws. Considering such features, it seems 
that the model of explanation which best fits the 
sensorimotor account is the covering law model.   
The Covering Law Model 
According to the covering law model, or more 
appropriately, the deductive-nomological (DN) model 
(Hempel & Oppenheim 1948; see also Salmon 1989), 
explanations are arguments from premises, the explanans, to 
a conclusion, the explanandum phenomenon, which is 
deductively entailed by the premises.  
The DN model has its roots in the era of logical 
positivism, dominated by an anti-metaphysical standpoint. 
Hempel’s model contributed to the clarification of the 
notion of scientific explanation by describing it as a purely 
logical relation. According to the DN model, the explanans 
is composed by at least a law of nature and a singular 
statement of antecedent condition (boundary condition). The 
explanandum phenomenon figures in the DN model as the 
conclusion of the argument, which ought to be deduced 
from the premises.  
Let us focus on some key features of the DN model. In 
order to have a deductive-nomological explanation, the 
following criteria must be met: the explanation must be a 
valid deductive argument; the explanans must contain at 
least one general law; the explanans must have empirical 
content; the sentences in the explanans must be true.  
 The DN model is today widely considered untenable. In 
this context, I will only focus on one specific problem. The 
fact is that the explanatory power of the DN model crucially 
depends on distinguishing true laws of nature from 
accidental generalizations. Only laws of nature are 
explanatory, whereas accidental generalizations are not. 
Whilst the appeal to laws of nature in physics is rather 
common, the case of the special sciences, like psychology 
and biology, is quite different. 
Cummins (2000) has persuasively argued that what 
psychologists sometimes call “laws” are in fact descriptions 
of effects: for instance, the Garcia effect, the McGurk effect, 
and others. Effects do not have any explanatory relevance: 
they merely describe a phenomenon which needs to be 
explained. If the sensorimotor theory provides DN 
explanations of vision, we need to verify the nature of the 
sensorimotor invariances and clarify whether they actually 
are laws. 
Subsuming Vision under Sensorimotor Laws 
Consider the sensorimotor theory’s account of vision. 
According to this model, when an object is visually “given”, 
it triggers the system in such a way that the motor actions 
exhibited constitute visual perception, and that such motor 
actions obey a set of specific laws.  
A rough, albeit intuitive schema for the sensorimotor 
explanation could be the following:  
 
Sensorimotor Law of Visual Perception 
Target Object O 
 
Visual Perception of O 
 
It is important to stress that neither Noë nor O’Regan 
have explicitly described the sensorimotor account as 
providing a covering-law explanation. Moreover, they have 
never spelled out the notion of ‘law’ clearly. But the 
similarity with the DN model is striking. From the fact that 
the motor actions triggered by the distal object O obey a set 
of sense-specific laws, it follows that the primary effort 
should be that of finding out and to describe the 
sensorimotor laws. Once we will have completely described 
the sensorimotor laws, we will also have a complete account 
of the structure of vision. However, one could rightly ask at 
this point: What are the sensorimotor laws? 
The Nature of the Sensorimotor Laws 
As I have explained above, it is a matter of debate 
whether there actually are laws in special sciences such as 
biology and psychology. Clearly, if we want to explain 
vision through the sensorimotor laws, it is paramount to 
determine their nature. According to the DN model, the laws 
of nature are sentences, which, as we have seen, are used as 
premises of an argument. In this paragraph, I argue that 
what O’Regan and Noë call ‘sensorimotor laws’ are actually 
better described as mechanisms.  
In their paper, O’Regan & Noë (2001) discuss some of 
such laws. As I have explained in the first paragraph, there 
are two kinds of sensorimotor contingencies: those 
determined by the visual system and those determined by 
the visual attributes. The first law that I will discuss is of the 
former kind, the second one belongs to the latter.  
First Example: Eye Rotation 
Rotation of the eye alters the stimulation on the retina in a 
way determined by the size of the eye movement, the shape 
of the retina, and the nature of ocular optics (O’Regan & 
Noë 2001, p. 941).  
 
 
Figure 1: Eye Rotation (borrowed from O’Regan & Noë 
2001) 
 
As figure 1 shows, eye movement distorts the straight line 
in such a way as to describe a greater arc in (a) and a 
smaller one in (b). The alteration of the stimulus on the 
retina depends not only on the eye rotation, but also on the 
structure of the retina. The alteration of the stimulus on the 
retina is transmitted in such a way as to deliver different 
cortical representations.  
O’Regan and Noë maintain that the alterations of the 
stimulus and consequent sensorimotor response would be 
constrained by different structural laws that are specific to 
the sense of vision. The task of the vision scientists, and the 
philosophers interested in visual perception, is that of 
describing the laws in order to understand how the organism 
exhibits a specific sensorimotor response.   
Second Example: Visual Shape 
The other example of sensorimotor law discussed by the 
authors is that of visual shape. As I have explained above, 
the second kind of sensorimotor contingencies is determined 
by visual attributes, which means by specific features of our 
conscious visual phenomenology such as colors and shapes. 
This second kind of sensorimotor laws is related to visual 
perception whereas the former, as we have seen, are related 
to visual sensation. 
According to the authors, shape perception would be “the 
set of all potential distortion that the shape undergoes” 
(O’Regan & Noë 2001, p. 942) when we move in relation to 
the object or when it is the object itself which moves in 
relation to us. From these movements, the brain abstracts a 
set of laws which code the shape perception. 
That shape perception depends on the laws abstracted by 
the variances produced by body movements would be 
illustrated by patients who enjoyed restored visual 
perception after being born blind with congenital cataract. 
Clinical histories provide plenty of examples. Helmholtz 
(quoted in O’Regan & Noë 2001, p. 942) for instance cites 
the case of a patient who, after visual restoration, is 
surprised that the coin apparently changes its shape when 
rotated. According to O’Regan and Noë, the “surprise” this 
patient felt would be due to the fact that upon restoration of 
sight, the visual phenomenology is dramatically altered in 
such a way as to enable abstractions of specific laws 
previously inaccessible. 
Sensorimotor Mechanisms 
As I have said, according to the DN model propositions 
are sentences used as premises in an argument. Yet, the 
examples of sensorimotor laws just discussed do not seem 
to support this interpretation. I suspect that the appeal to 
‘laws’ in the sensorimotor theory reveals the lingering 
tendency to provide covering law explanations. The 
phenomena just examined are better described as 
mechanisms. 
The term ‘mechanism’ is often used by biologists and 
neuroscientists (Craver 2007), as well as by cognitive 
scientists (Bechtel 2008). But what is a mechanism? Bechtel 
(2008) defines mechanisms as structures performing a 
function in virtue of their component parts, operations, and 
their organizations. The way we characterize parts and 
operations crucially depends on the field of investigation 
and therefore the kind of phenomena studied. For instance, 
many fields of biology determine both the explanandum 
phenomenon and the operations as involving physical 
transformation of material substances. To provide a 
mechanistic explanation basically means to show how the 
joint interactions of the component parts and operations 
results in the production of the explanandum phenomenon. I 
will now consider again the two examples of sensorimotor 
law described above from the mechanistic standpoint. 
Allegedly, the first ‘sensorimotor law’ accounts for the 
alterations of the signal on the retina and the consequent 
sensorimotor response through vision-specific structural 
laws. It is by describing the mechanics of the eye that we 
can explain the alteration of the stimulus on the retina. Yet, 
it is not clear how we should understand this claim. We 
could interpret this observing that eye movements obey the 
laws of mechanics. Yet, this interpretation would obviously 
be trivial. Moreover, it would be an utter mystery why such 
laws should help us explain visual perception. 
A better way to figure out how to explain the alterations 
of the signal on the retina would be to provide a mechanistic 
explanation of the eye’s movements. In mechanistic terms, 
the different component parts are physical and the 
operations are their movements. The explanandum 
phenomenon, the alteration of the signal on the retina, can 
be explained by reconstructing the way the specific 
mechanism behaves without introducing the inaccurate 
notion of ‘law’. 
Consider now the second case. Visual shape perception 
would depend on ‘laws’ abstracted by the brain on the basis 
of the variances produced through bodily movements. The 
abstracted laws, as we have seen, define the set of all 
potential shape distortion. In this case it remains completely 
obscure why we should understand the potential distortions 
as ‘laws’, nor is it clear why such ‘laws’ should account for 
shape perception. Noë and O’Regan remain silent on this 
issue.  
The case of shape perception is perhaps more tricky; yet, I 
think that this example, too, can be better described from the 
mechanistic standpoint. Even if we agree on the 
sensorimotor account of shape perception, it would still be 
required that the brain ‘recognizes’ and processes the 
information concerning the object’s shape. But this would 
be better accounted from a mechanistic standpoint, as an 
example of a mental mechanism: the component parts are 
functional units processing information concerning visual 
shape. Accordingly, cases of restored vision could be 
reinterpreted as processing information previously 
inaccessible, without introducing any mysterious 
sensorimotor ‘law’. 
If my remarks are correct, I would propose a mechanistic 
reformulation of the sensorimotor theory: the sensorimotor 
laws are actually sensorimotor mechanisms. This 
reformulation of the sensorimotor theory has several 
implications that I will now explore. 
Sensorimotor Mechanisms and Information: 
A Return of Representations? 
The way we describe the phenomena considered here is 
not only a verbal dispute. Laws and mechanisms are 
explanatorily different. I contend that it is precisely the 
introduction of the notion of law, vague and never really 
clarified in the O’Regan and Noë’s paper, that leads to the 
rejection of the explanatory power of representations. Yet, if 
we reject the ‘law’ interpretation of the phenomena we have 
described, a number of theoretical consequences follow. I 
will now consider some of them.  
First, and most importantly, a mechanistic reading helps 
us solving a confusion within the sensorimotor theory 
concerning representations. As I have explained, the theory 
does not reject the existence of representation, but it 
undermines their explanatory power. It is not through 
representations that we can hope to explain vision, but 
through the two kinds of sensorimotor laws. Yet, in 
O’Regan and Noë (2001) it is not exactly clear what role do 
representations play. Noë (2004, p. 22) claims that it is not 
possible to deny the existence of representations altogether. 
Similarly, in their response against criticisms, O’Regan and 
Noë agree that the visual system ‘stores information’ and 
that such information influences the perceiver (2001, p. 
1017). If we hold a representational interpretation of the 
information processing, and this seems to be the authors’ 
stance (O’Regan & Noë 2001, p. 1017), then the 
sensorimotor theory includes representations but deny that 
they have any explanatory power. After all, representations 
are repeatedly mentioned in their description of the 
sensorimotor laws: it is through the sensorimotor laws 
governing eye movement that the signal on the retina is 
altered thus producing different cortical representations.  
The authors put the explanatory burden of vision entirely 
on the sensorimotor laws: it is precisely this that leads 
O’Regan and Noë to an unclear position concerning the role 
of representations. But if we interpret the sensorimotor laws 
as mechanisms, the role of representations in perception 
needs to be reconsidered. 
According to the interpretation that I have laid out, we 
should distinguish between two kinds of mechanisms. The 
first one provides an example of a physical mechanism 
affecting the signal on the retina. The second one provides 
an example of a mental mechanism that process 
information. In both cases, the notion of information is 
central, counterbalancing the focus on the motor actions.  
What remains to be questioned is the nature of such 
information being processed, and whether it can be defined 
as representational or not. In any case, switching the focus 
from the sensorimotor laws to the sensorimotor mechanisms 
prompts us to reconsider the role of the information 
processed in the explanation of vision and its 
representational interpretation.  
Conclusion 
My remarks are not meant to reject the sensorimotor 
theory. The crucial question is to understand the nature of 
sensorimotor laws, and therefore to understand which role 
they play within the sensorimotor account of vision. I have 
tried to show that such laws are actually better characterized 
as mechanisms. This has some relevant consequences, since 
the explanatory structure of the theory dramatically changes 
in the two interpretations. 
According to the “law” interpretation, the purpose of 
vision research is to describe the laws governing the 
sensorimotor reactions without relying on representations. 
On the contrary, according to the mechanistic interpretation, 
the concept of information and, perhaps, of representation, 
returns as an important explanatory component.  
Finally, there is still another important implication of the 
mechanistic interpretation of the sensorimotor theory: a 
more balanced account of the relations between action and 
perception that does not bind them too tight, but stresses the 
relevance of the sensorimotor action to the modulation of 
the information processing. 
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